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Liberalism's PublicIPrivate Split
Betty Mensch and Alan Freeman

N

othing is more central to our experience in
American culture than the split between public
and private. It is the premise that lies at the
foundation of American legal thought, and it also shapes
the way in which we relate to one another in our daily
lives. We take for granted that there is a public realm
and a private realm. I n the private realm we assume
that we operate within a protected sphere of autonomy,
free to make choices and to b e secure against the
encroachment of others. Private law (e.g., contract law)
serves as a helpmate in this realm, facilitating and
ensuring the autonomous world of private decisionmaking. I n contrast, the public realm is a world of
governmental institutions obligated to serve the "public
interest" rather than "private" aims. For the most part,
the public realm is accountable to the private, and it is
obligated t o limit its intrusion into the world of private
choice; but occasionally it is supposed t o override the
private sphere, either t o serve a greater public good or
to solve problems that are poorly or deficiently handled
by private decision-making.
While it is important to recognize the role of the
private/public split in legal thought, its real significance
lies in the powerful way it informs o u r daily experience.
Part of our reality is to "know" that the public realm is
different from the private, that these realms are both
"there" and separate from each other, with differnt
things happening in each one. That knowledge, in turn,
molds even our closest relationships. We were reminded
of this fact recently during a phone conversation with
a good friend. We had just produced a new baby, a fourth
son in our busy household, and our. friend said she
hoped we would now stop reproducing. Then she quickly
retreated into apology, afraid she had offended us. At
first her fear seemed puzzling, but then it made sense:
I n our culture one is not supposed t o tell people what
one thinks of their reproductive behavior. Family planning choices take place in the world of "family privacy,"
which is a world of private, autonomous decision
making. Even friends are expected not t o intrude into
that protected sphere; t o d o so is to violate the norms
of privacy. O u r friend's apologetic manner is what we
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mean by taking the public/private split for granted as
part of our daily experience.
A few moments of reflection, however, show the
extent to which that supposed realm of privacy is a
product of cultural contingency, not objective reality.
Since reproduction, for example, is the process by which
a society reconstitutes itself, many cultures consider
family planning an obvious matter of social concern and
choose accordingly either to encourage o r discourage
the creation of large families. Even in cultures where
sexuality and reproduction are ostensibly "private," our
experience of them is socially constituted. Unless one
is prepared not only to head for the wilderness, but
also to discard all previously acquired cultural baggage,
the notion of raising children in "pure privacy" is an
impossibility. We look, often frantically, to the social
realm for guidance and understanding of parental roles.
That we turn to Dr. Spock and other experts when we
have difficulty as parents underscores the social dimension of our experience.
Once the public/private split is recognized to b e
merely an artificial construct, new possibilities for
human contact arise. Where one erects walls of privacy
around oneself, o n e is denied access to others. Privacy
means alienation, and if some of these walls of privacy
were dissolved and traditionally private questions were
transformed into community concerns, then we might
feel more connected to others. O u r sense of ourselves
and of others would change, and our world would, in
turn, b e altered.
Instead of attempting to transform the public realm
into a genuine community, many of us seek authentic
experiences by retreating into the private realm-by
using the private realm as an antidote t o the alienating
world of competitive, possessive, individualism. Thus,
in the words of Christopher Lasch, the family is experienced as the "haven in a heartless world." Similarly,
many of us try to find true meaning through religious
experience and the social life that accompanies it. Finally,
many of us think we achieve genuine interpersonal connection in the most private realm of all, when we fall
in love. Yet the relegation of these experiences to the
realm of privacy always serves to limit their significance.
Because they are private they are trivialized and rendered
irrelevant t o the "real world."
Nevertheless, because our world is dominated by the
forms of liberal legalism through which we bear "private
rights," the rhetoric of militant privatism has provided

an important weapon in certain battles. As the Bork
hearings illustrated, a threat t o our "right" t o privacy
induces widespread fear and discomfort. I t is true that
in the abortion area gaining the right to private, autonomous reproductive choice has seemed an important
feminist victory. Yet the language of privatism is a
double-edged sword. As women who struggle alone to
raise children know, reproductive choice conceived only
as a private right serves to isolate and deny the woman's
claim for communal help and shared responsibility. To
have "private" choice is also to b e left alone with it.
Moreover, in the economic realm the rhetoric of privacy
has traditionally been used to transform the social
dimensions of poverty into a fantasy about autonomous
choice in which poverty results from individual failure.
It is therefore not surprising that the formal freedom
t o obtain an abortion does not mean the right to have
one paid for by the community; the poverty of the
woman who cannot afford an abortion is her own
"private" problem. That was the lesson learned when
the supposedly liberating Roe v. Wade was followed by
Harris v. McRae, which entitled the government to
deny health benefits to low-income women to cover the
expenses of even "medically necessary" abortions.
Thus, within liberal legalism privacy may be a weapon
to gain freedom from others in the short run, but it may
provide the justification for abandonment of the individual by others in the long run. This "short-run,
long-run" problem can best b e understood against a
more general theoretical backdrop. For the purpose of
understanding the ideology of private rights, nothing
has really improved upon Marx's classic account in his
early essay, " O n the Jewish Question." Despite the
essay's somewhat heavy, dated, Hegelian terminology
(state and civil society rather than simply public and
private, for example), and its at times blatant antiSemitism, it still remains the fullest account of liberal
ideology.
arx starts by describing the emancipation of
the political state from the yoke of traditional
status and power. Under the old feudal, hierarchial model, political life was inseparable from social
privilege based o n religious, economic, and class background. Because political status was bound u p with
social status, religious and property qualifications were
attached to the right to vote. I n contrast, citizenship in
the liberal state is freed of these qualifications: As
citizen, the Jew is as free as the Christian, and the poor
person is on an equal footing with the landed aristocrat.
Thus, the state becomes the arena for the exercise of
free political participation and the realization of true
community. I n this sphere, at least, alienating religious
and class divisions are dissolved. This liberation of the

state has been "a great step forward," a step away from
separateness and toward community (or, using Marx's
term, "species being").
Nevertheless, the emancipation of the state has not
brought complete human emancipation because the old
distinctions have been retained "outside" the state, in the
form of private rights. Thus, religion, rather than being
abolished, becomes a "private whim," an expression of
purely subjective, individualized value. Similarly, while
property is n o longer a prerequisite for political participation, it is nevertheless retained as a protected right
with which the state cannot interfere. Property as a
private right, stripped of the old notions of moral/
political obligation (e.g., the feudal lords to their serfs),
both presupposes and legitimates a realm of egoism,
self-interest, and atomization-i.e., the market. In that
sphere there is only helium omnium contra ovzrzes,
which, as Marx says, is "the essence not of community
but . . . of division."

Instead of attempting to transform
the public realm into a genuine
community, many of us seek
authentic experiences by retreating
into the private realm.
Marx insists that he is describing actual historical
changes that took place when liberalism emerged, but
h e is also describing a change in consciousness, in the
way that people experience the world. The split between
public and private lies at the heart of that liberal
consciousness, for it means that we simultaneously view
others both as fellow citizens in a true community and
as separate, antagonistic private others. Thus, as Marx
says, "man leads a double life . . . [I]n the political
community he regards himself as a communalheing; but
in civil society h e is active as a private individual, treats
other men as means, and becomes the plaything of
alien powers." [Marx's emphasis]
Moreover, because the most important daily activities
-work, family life, and moral choice-are all experienced as private and apolitical, the experience of community becomes increasingly abstract, realized at the
level of fantasy and ritual rather than as concrete reality,
Most "citizens" have little direct experience of participation in collective decision-making, so each of them
becomes an "imaginary member of an imagined sovereignty." The "state," too, becomes an abstract, alien other,
rather than an arena for the experience of community.
Significantly, the public/private split also reproduces
itself within the realm of the private, doing so most

starkly in the markedfamily dichotomy. In theory, the
market offers an arena for atomized, competitive selfinterest, while the family provides a place for warmth,
selflessness, and interconnectedness. Thus conceived,
that dichotomy in turn represents the conventional,
stereotypic split between male and female roles. For in
the market, the most public and powerful of the private
realms, men can play out their "maleness" by being
aggressive and domineering, while women, contained
within the family sphere, play out their female roles by
providing a safe, nurturing home. Thus, the traditional
rigidity of gender identification is inextricably linked to
the supposed boundary between market and family,
which in turn is an integral subset of the basic liberal
split between public and private.
A crucial ingredient in liberal ideology, as described
by Marx, is the fact that the publidprivate split actually
entails a tripartite structure of self, state, and other.
Because of that structure, there is always an alienating
third that mediates the relationship between self and
other. Other "private" individuals are experienced, not
in direct relationship, but rather by reference to a state
that sets the ground rules of the relationship, determining the extent of each person's rights and duties. In
every relationship the state is a potential ally and a
potential foe. At the same time, each individual experiences others simultaneously as citizens-part of the
collectivity-and as private rights-holders. The state can
never be simply the community because the community
is composed of individuals who also define themselves
as rights-holders with private interests potentially at
odds both with the interests of others and with the
collective experience. Just as each of us leads a "double
life" as citizen and private rights-holder, so too do we
constantly experience others, not as unified wholes,
but as members of the "democratic" collectivity, on the
one hand. and as atomized individuals on the other.

T

here are four important notions that, in tandem,
help to maintain this triadic structure within
our consciousness-to make it, in other words,
powerful as ideology. These four notions can be called
limit, illusion, legitimation, and contradiction. They
operate simultaneously at the level of legal thought and
at the level of day-to-day consciousness.
The first, the notion of limit, means that there is a
line separating public from private, a boundary where
one ends and the other begins. That line can be moved
dramatically over time, and it can sometimes be hard
to find or quite fuzzy around the edges. But the key
point is that the line is always present somewhere. On
the public side of the line we assume that there is an
obligation to act responsibly, with a sense of accountability to others. The existence of a boundary, however,
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means that at some point accountability ends.
The "state action" cases are all cases about this dual
message of responsibility and limit. In these cases, the
Supreme Court has been called upon to interpret the
provision of the Fourteenth Amendment mandating
that "No State shall . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." That
provision makes racial discrimination a matter of public
concern if the entity responsible for the discrimination
can be regarded in some sense as the "state," i.e., public
not private. In many instances the line between state
action and private action has shifted dramatically, often
in ways we consider progressive.
One can applaud, for example, the change in this
doctrine between the 1880s and the 1960s. In 1875,
Congress enacted a law barring racial discrimination in
places of public accommodation (hotels, theaters, etc.).
In the Civil Rights Cases, however, the Supreme Court,
invoking classic publidprivate assumptions, declared
that the statute was an unconstitutional intrusion into
the sphere of private social life. The limit to public
accountability had been exceeded, since the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibits discriminatory action only by
the state. Not until the modern civil rights movement
almost a hundred years later would similar legislation
again be enacted; then, as we know, it was upheld.
Yet the change did nothing to undermine the basic
proposition that there is a line beyond which it is inappropriate to hold the public accountable for racially
discriminatory results. Thus, despite all of the legal
advances in the area of antidiscrimination law, it is still
legitimate to treat concrete social facts, such as continuing high rates of unemployment among minorities,
high poverty rates, and basic exclusion from mainstream
American life, as somehow outside the sphere of direct
public responsibility.
The notion of a limit on accountability works powerfully, not just in setting legal limits, but also in shaping
our responses to the world. It allows us, for example,
to interpret the social reality of minorities trapped in
ghettos as a fact of private rather than public life, and
therefore outside the range of our direct responsibility.
As a result, empathetic responses ("I'd have a really
hard time raising my children in those conditions tooI'd hate to see them feeling trapped and hopeless about
the future") are always distorted by the assumption
that the reality being witnessed is in the private realmthat it is shaped by free choice and is not the result of
public coercion.
This is not to say, of course, that the notion of
privatism is the only distancing mechanism shaping our
perceptions. The feudal model of divinely ordained
hierarchy, now supposedly defunct, remains alive in the
form of stereotypical assumptions about lower classes,

women, and minorities. "They" are not really like "us";
they are not bothered by conditions that would bother
us; it is more natural for them to live like that.
Another vestige of the hierarchical view can be found
in our modern notion of merit. A sophisticated version
of divinely ordained hierarchy, one more consistent
with the public/private split, this notion assumes that
there is a natural ordering of abilities-one independent
of class, sex, or race-that determines outcomes in a
free society. Given equal opportunity, the skillful, the
daring, and the hardworking will be the ones who
come out ahead. The belief in objective merit, however
at odds with reality, has of course played a key role in
the ideology of the free market-success in the marketplace reflects "natural ability" rather than socially constituted hierarchy.
Even if we reject all such assumptions about the
legitimacy of social hierarchies, we still may be unable
to transcend the distancing effect of the public/private
split. In fact, we are almost inevitably trapped by it.
Should we attempt to recognize that the problems of
others are our concerns, we would hardly know how to
begin to cope with them. In the absence of genuine
shared communal responsibility, gestures of concern
are quickly turned into idle, private, and frequently
condescending acts of charity. If we donate money to
"toys for tots" or to the church soup kitchen, we are,
to be sure, providing a toy for a child, or a meal for a
hungry person, but we are also affirming the regime of
nonresponsibility that makes the act of charity one
chosen by subjective whim. Given the public/private
split, we are forced to be selfish as much as we choose
to be selfish, for in the absence of real community, our
communal gestures can only be privately expressed. In
the private realm, where free choice is presumably
protected, none of us is free to choose the rejection of
privacy itself because others will quickly respond to
such efforts as intrusive, threatening, or simply crazy.
This lack of freedom to choose a community of real
sharing is closely connected to the second notion that
makes the public/private split so effective-illusion.
The existence of a public realm allows us to believe
that, the force of the private sphere notwithstanding,
in the public sphere we are together as citizens, participating equally and fully. The public realm constantly
holds out the possibility of community even while the
reality of daily life denies it. Because that daily denial
is so pervasive, the ideal of public community must
constantly be affirmed through the social production of
imagery in order to prevent us from directly confronting
our loneliness and isolation. We must have the illusion
of communal experience, even if reality does not bear
it out. The media have become especially effective
conveyors of this illusion, for the shared television
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viewing of national events provides the feeling that we
are all participating in national life. Although in fact
we are only passive viewers of an image, we feel that
we are joined with others, taking part in the life of the
country. The recent Miss Liberty and Constititution
Bicentennial celebrations provided ceremonial versions
of that illusory experience, but so-called national
tragedies also have a similar effect. President Reagan
has been especially adept at using funerals for this purpose, simultaneously masking underlying problems of
corruption and ineptitude, as in the space shuttle
explosion.
As Reagan also demonstrated in his first years in office,
the illusion of the public community can be strengthened
through the identification of enemies. We have seen
him create such enemies in Khomeini, in "International
Terrorism" and, most effectively, in Khadafy. Figures
like Khadafy serve a useful ideological purpose: However separate and private we are otherwise, we, "as a
nation,"-as members of an illusory community-can
share our hatred for him.

s

trengthening the image of public togetherness in
turn facilitates the third notion associated with
the public/private split-legitimation. With the
illusion of togetherness intact, we deem it acceptable
to be acquisitive and competitive in the private sphere,
to scorn others and to take advantage of their weaknesses. Disparities of wealth and power that result
from this social and economic Bellum omnium contra
omnes are by definition legitimate because they are a
function of private, autonomous choice, not the public
exercise of political power. To redress these disparities
would be to invade the protected sphere of private
rights.
Legitimation requires an elaborate structure of law
to maintain the theoretical distinction between public
and private activity. It is the conception of legally
enforceable rights that gives credibility to the assumption
that private activity is in fact purely private, so that the
exercise of private power does not appear to be publicly
sanctioned oppression. Thus, public law is to be distinguished from private law-property, torts, and contracts
w h i c h simply facilitates the private ordering of social
and economic life. Private law doctrine is thus a long
and detailed meditation on the idea of protected free
choice within a fixed and judicially determined limit.
Legally determinable rights ensure that each person is
secure against both public coercion and oppressive
private power.
Private rights, however, are, necessarily, not only
about freedom, but about exclusion as well. The positive
side of free choice always carries with it a negative flip
side: This is mine, therefore it's not yours. I've got it so
you don't. Similarly, while there is a positive side to
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recognizing the other as a rights-holder ("I respect
your autonomy, your right to make your own choices"),
there is a negative side as well, because rights are
premised on the denial of the freedom to share. ("Because you have it, it's not mine; because it's yours, I
cannot have it without your consent.") Of course, a
major premise of traditional marketplace theory is that
"consent" is something that must be purchased, experienced as a barrier, thereby alienating the other from
oneself.
In truth, the line between public and private is logically incoherent, and this incoherence has been apparent
since the Legal Realist movement of the 1920s and 30s.
The realist scholars, part of the general twentieth-century
revolt against formalism and conceptualism, convincingly
undermined all faith in the objective existence of "rights"
by challenging the ideological premises upon which the
public/private distinction is based.
Property, for example, is thought to be the paradigmatic private right. In his famous essay, "Property and
Sovereignty," Morris Cohen pointed out that property
is necessarily public, not private, since "property" means
the legally granted power to withhold from others; and
as such, it is created and protected by the state. In
short, property law is simply a form of public law.
Similarly, with respect to freedom of contract, the power
to exclude or withhold is central to the supposedly
freely-entered bargain. Free consent to the other's terms
is in fact forced consent, for it derives from the other's
legally sanctioned threat to withhold what is owned
except upon the demanded payment. It is the state that
delegates the power to exclude and therefore to set the
terms: without public coercion, there would be no
private freedom of contract. Thus, the line between
private right and public power dissolves-the former
collapses into the latter.
Despite its apparent incoherence, however, the language of public and private persists, both in legal
discourse and as part of our experience. Its continuing
viability and power to legitimate may be due, in large
part, to its manipulability. Precisely because it has no
logical content at all, it can easily b e turned inside out.
The legal literature is filled, for example, with theoretical
invocations of public welfare to justify the consolidation
of hierarchical property relations. Thus, in the typical
exclusionary zoning case, the supposedly free private
market would allow developers to subdivide building
lots and erect cheap housing in otherwise fancy (usually
all-white) neighborhoods. In such situations, the "community" is allowed to establish rules to prevent the
erection of such cheap housing, despite the fact that
the community with its "police power" is being invoked
simply to reinforce private acquisitive, racist behavior.
Similarly, the public purpose doctrine has been invoked repeatedly to justify subsidies to enterprises that

otherwise claim the right to be treated as private.
Historically, railroads were notorious beneficiaries: the
state's eminent domain rights were granted to railway
companies o n the theory that the public would benefit
from an expanding transportation system, even while the
companies of course retained their right to a "private"
profit.

M

odern examples abound. Conventional free
market ideology extols the virtues of private
capital accumulation, entrepreneurial skill,
and the harsh reality of risk. Yet tax breaks are routinely
granted to entice industries to invest or remain in
localities, cities compete for the opportunity to provide
sports teams with ever more luxurious stadiums, and
huge companies get government help when they face
financial ruin. Private companies rarely turn down the
opportunity to eat greedily from the public trough.
Two recent cases serve to illustrate the point. I n the
first, Poletown Neighborhood Council u. City o f Detroit,
the Michigan Supreme C.ourt invoked the public character of large private enterprise in allowing a whole
neighborhood in Detroit to be destroyed, at huge personal cost to displaced neighborhood residents, so that
General Motors could build a plant on that location.
The theory was that public good would result from the
plant's opening because the plant would provide jobs.
Ironically, however, in Local 1330, United Stcrltuorkcm
u. U.S. Steel, an appellate court affirmed the privateness
of large corporations and refused to stop the closing of
two plants in Youngstown, Ohio, despite the court's
stated awareness that the move would cause "an economic tragedy of major proportion'' in the area. Rejecting
the argument that the local community had gained a
recognizable property interest or community "right" in
the plants over the years, the court held that because
the company was privately owned, its economic decisions
were beyond public reach.
The point here is not that the courts were wrong in
attempting to make their public/private decisions, but
rather that anything can b e described as either public
or private. Decisions during the 1985-86 Supreme Court
term illustrated that point vividly. The Court refused to
hold airlines sufficiently "public" to b e required to
comply with antidiscrimination laws with respect to the
treatment of the handicapped, despite the quite apparent
subsidization of comnlercial airlines through the air
traffic controller system (a "public" service, as Reagan
was at pains to point out when the controllers went on
strike and he fired them, which he could not have done
if they were in the "private" sector).Then, only a couple
of weeks later, in the famous Bowers v. Ha~dwzckcase,
the Court announced that even voluntary consensual
sexual acts were not sufficiently private to preclude
state regulation. While the act that was upheld was

apparently directed at homosexuals, on whom the Court
has never conferred "rights" as such, the Court did not
seem to preclude regulation of sexual acts even between
husband and wife. In effect, that which seems the most
private was declared public, while that which seems (as
we stand in line at a busy airport waiting for a security
check) most public, is declared private. Paradoxically,
the legal system defines the world for us as public and
private; and then, through its particular definitions, it is
free to stand in dramatic contrast to our daily experience.
The indeterminacy of the public/private split is closely
related to the fourth associated notion-contradiction.
As the airline/sexuality pairing denlonstrates, neither
the public nor the private category has any objective
content. As a result, contradictory arguments about
private rights can always b e generated. As a matter of
pure logic, nothing is excluded from the state's legitimate
concern for the public welfare. Similarly, as between
two conflicting private rights, logical arguments can
always be made for either side. My private right to be
secure from the invasion of a nuisance, like the smelly
chemicals you spray on your lawn, conflicts with your
right to use your property freely. My right t o be secure
from oppressive competition conflicts with your right
to engage in unbridled freedom of contract. In each
instance, the state must choose between two mutually
exclusive rights.

In the economic realm the rhetoric
of privacy has traditionally been
used to transform the social
dimensions of poverty into a fantasy
about autonomous choice in which
poverty results/rom individual
failure.
Others have written about the problem of contradiction, which belies the legal system's claim to be a
neutral protector of rights. Contradiction also is manifcstecl in our personal experience-in our sense of how
we should relate to others. The contradiction between
market freedom and security of expectations that pervades private law discourse reflects deeply held beliefs
about how we should act in the world, beliefs that
are ultimately contradictory. O n the one hand, we
believe that we should b e free to take advantage of
another's weakness in the market, but on the other
hand, we feel obliged to respect the interests of others.
First-year law students are genuinely troubled when
they discover that contract law, for example, does not
have a convincing answer to the question of where

self-interest ends and concern for another's security
begins. What their unhappiness reveals is that they
believe in both the free exercise of self-interest and in
the good-faith protection of others. They then find
themselves feeling immobilized: in the face of evident
contradiction, how can one make a strong moral choice?
The same feeling that law students begin to recognize
self-consciously is experienced by most people as an
iinarticulated sense of moral immobilization.

T

he fact that contradiction undermines the legal
system's claim to be a neutral protector of rights
also intensifies the degree to which the triadic
structure of state/self/other pervades our relationships.
At any given time, one's position with respect to another
has to be seen as a function of a series of logically incoherent choices the state has made, choices that sometimes are favorable and sometimes antagonistic. If you
complain about your neighbor's barking dog, the police
may give your neighbor a hard time, or they may tell
you that "life is like that." They may show up next time,
having been called by your neighbor, to make you mow
your overgrown weed-filled lawn, or you may convince
them that you are an ecologist legitimately excercising
your right to experiment with "natural" lawn. The fact
that these choices cannot be preordained or logically
compelled makes us feel the state's power all the more
acutely.

As women who struggle alone to
raise children know, reproductive
choice conceived only as a private
right serves to isolate and to deny
the woman? claim for communal
help and shared responsibility. To
have "private" choice is also to be
left alone with it.
It is common, however, especially among liberals, to
consider problematic certain parts of the public/private
distinction, while at the same time assuming that there
is some core meaning to the notion of privacy, one that
is natural rather than simply a creation of legal/political
ideology. Thus, one might quite willingly concede that
Con Edison is not obviously and perfectly private, but
what about my home, my body, my thoughts?
Even in such cases, however, the supposed core right
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to privacy can be collapsed into contradiction. Thus,
my freedom to keep a goat in my home and ~ a r d
conflicts with my neighbors' collective right to be secure
in the respectability of the neighborhood in which they
have invested; and one person's right to the free enjoyment of sexual fantasy conflicts with another's right to
be secure against the degrading and exploitative use of
bodies. Moreover, as in the market, so too, even within
the family, we can have no faith in the supposed purity
of private, subjective consent, for consent is always in
part a function of social roles and expectations. A
wife's consent to sexual relations with her husband, for
example, is in part publicly constructed, for in every
instance we all, inescapably, act out the social representations of the roles assigned to us-the wife's consent
is inevitably consent by a person who thinks of herself
as "wife," and this publicly created consciousness informs
even her most private, subjective decisions.
If the structure of private rights and state power
renders incoherent the vocabulary of rights, how then
can we affirm the values that seem most important to
us? Feminists, for example, feel deeply divided on the
question of pornography. In light of the debasing use
of female bodies, we are tempted to seek protection.
The state should guarantee our security against such
exploitation irrespective of the pornographer's invocation of a private right to freedom of speech. Yet the
same state that might side with us now could also end
up as the ally of the Phyllis Schlaflys of the world who
wish to oppress us with their conventionality. And the
same First Amendment invoked by our exploitative
enemy may in the future protect us against state power.
Is there, even imaginably, a radical alternative view
that does not require us to go on living the public/private
split? Two related agendas suggest themselves. O n e is
to recognize that the decision to employ the rhetoric of
privacy is just that, a strategic move, and that the real
solution is to end the relations of power that permeate
our society. From that perspective, the issue is not
privacy as such, but how to fashion a world without our
current hierarchies of power, one of which is the physical
abuse of women by men. That suggests the other agenda
-the fashioning of communities where one need not
hide behind the "private" either for protection or selfaggrandizement, where relationships might b e just "us"
" y o u , and me, and the rest of usn-deciding for
ourselves what we want, without the alienating third of
t h e state." In that setting, however remote it may
seem, we might even make group decisions about
reproduction, replacing our pervasive alienation and
fear of one another with something more like mutual
trust, o r love. 0

